A quest for significance: Gulf oil monarchies' international 'soft power' strategies and their local urban dimensions by Hertog, Steffen
LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series | 42
A QUEST FOR SIGNIFICANCE 
GULF OIL MONARCHIES’ INTERNATIONAL ‘SOFT POWER’ 
STRATEGIES AND THEIR LOCAL URBAN DIMENSIONS
STEFFEN HERTOG
About the Middle East Centre
The Middle East Centre builds on LSE’s 
long engagement with the Middle East and 
provides a central hub for the wide range of 
research on the region carried out at LSE.
The Middle East Centre aims to enhance 
understanding and develop rigorous 
research on the societies, economies, 
polities and international relations of the 
region. The Centre promotes both special-
ised knowledge and public understanding 
of this crucial area and has outstanding 
strengths in interdisciplinary research and 
in regional expertise. As one of the world’s 
leading social science institutions, LSE 
comprises departments covering all 
branches of the social sciences. The Middle 
East Centre harnesses this expertise to 
promote innovative research and training on 
the region.
About the Kuwait Programme
The Kuwait Programme on Development, 
Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf 
States is a multidisciplinary global research 
programme based in the LSE Middle East 
Centre. The Programme currently funds a 
number of large-scale research projects, 
organises public lectures, seminars and 
workshops, produces an acclaimed working 
paper series, supports post-doctoral 
researchers and PhD students and develops 
academic networks between LSE and Gulf 
institutions. The Programme is funded by 
the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement 
of Sciences.
A QUEST FOR SIGNIFICANCE: GULF OIL 
MONARCHIES’ INTERNATIONAL ‘SOFT POWER’ 
STRATEGIES AND THEIR LOCAL URBAN DIMENSIONS
Steffen Hertog
LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series | 42
March 2017
About the Author
Steffen Hertog is Associate Professor of 
Comparative Politics in the Department 
of  Government at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science. He is a 
comparative political economist with a 
particular focus on the Middle East and the 
author of  Princes, Brokers and Bureaucrats: Oil 
and State in Saudi Arabia (Cornell University 
Press, 2011) and, with Diego Gambetta, 
of  Engineers of  Jihad: the Curious Connection 
between Violent Extremism and Education 
(Princeton University Press, 2016).
Abstract
This paper documents how the GCC 
oil monarchies have been using their oil 
wealth to buy the accoutrements of  ‘good 
citizenship’ and ‘progressiveness’ in the 
international arena through costly policy 
projects that involve urban interventions 
like the building of  international 
museums, universities and ‘zero-carbon 
cities’ – urban enclaves with an audience 
that is almost exclusively international. 
The paper explains how these projects 
reflect a desire to comply with Western-
defined ‘liberal’ international norms and 
tastes to gain international recognition, 
shows how they reflect broader patterns 
of  segmented state building in the Gulf, 
and explores some of  the social tensions 
they create locally. 
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The Puzzle
The mega-projects that the Gulf ’s oil monarchies have pursued in the course of  the post-
2000 oil boom have variously been described as tools of  economic diversification, vehicles 
of  self-enrichment for ruling elites, attempts to deepen strategic alliances with the world’s 
leading economic powers, or simply princely follies driven by surpluses too large for any 
government to handle rationally.
There is a subtle thread connecting a wide range of  projects that has gone undiscussed to 
date and that relates to a broader trend in Gulf  Cooperation Council (GCC) cultural, eco-
nomic and foreign policies: during the last decade and a half, Gulf  monarchies have been 
using their oil wealth to buy the accoutrements of  ‘good citizenship’ and ‘progressiveness’ 
in the international arena through outward-oriented and costly activities. These include 
overseas investments in strategic assets like media and renewable energy, the hosting of 
humanitarian conferences, arts and film festivals, bidding for the world’s leading sports 
events, generous aid policies, and support for international museums, higher education 
and research institutions. The Gulf  monarchies stand out among the world’s small coun-
tries in the range and scale of  their global ‘soft power’ ambitions.1
Some of  these policies have merely led to one-off  events or involved chequebook transac-
tions. In many cases, however, large-scale urban interventions were a critical component 
of  the GCC countries’ soft power initiatives. They have led to the building of  international 
museums, universities, ‘cities’ described as ‘media’, ‘zero-carbon’ and ‘economic’, often in 
enclaves that are disconnected from the rest of  the urban fabric. The political economy of 
this process in which local elites’ soft power ambitions are leaving a deep imprint on the 
region’s urban landscapes is the topic of  this paper. It focuses on the conjunction of  two 
forces that are specific to Gulf  rentier states: 
• the oil-funded emergence since the 1970s of  regulatory and spatial enclaves that are 
legally and geographically separate from the rest of  local states and societies;
• the increasing ambitions since the 2000s of  Gulf  rulers to make their small countries 
global leaders in the cultural, scientific and normative realms.
The enclave model initially served purely commercial purposes or was used to co-opt crit-
ical groups in local society. With the recent emergence of  soft power ambitions, however, 
new ‘soft power enclaves’ have come into being that combine legal and spatial segregation 
with a global normative mission. Unlike the older enclaves, they are also separate from local 
society in cultural and normative terms, giving rise to new social and political tensions.
1 The only comparable case with similar high-profile ‘branding’ projects might be Kazakhstan, a case 
I hope to investigate more closely in future research.
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Why is it Worth Explaining?
The Gulf  instinct to accompany new policies with new infrastructures might be natural: 
given state control over land, centralised decision-making, limited political participation 
and ample fiscal resources, most GCC rulers have faced few direct obstacles in doing so. 
International architects and planning firms are readily available to propose world-scale 
projects. They produce tangible, physical objects that give a semblance of  policy ‘results’ 
that might otherwise elude rulers.
Yet the nature of  the projects poses a puzzle: Almost invariably, the most daring and 
visible projects cater to Western-defined ‘liberal’ international norms and tastes. 
They are developed predominantly with international partners, consultants and con-
tractors and have an audience – regardless of  where specifically located – that is almost 
exclusively international. GCC citizens tend to be at best indifferent to new clean energy 
projects, museums or international universities. In some cases they even appear hostile 
to them.
In his book about class, democracy and diversification in high-rent GCC countries, 
Michael Herb argues that many nationals view the region’s fast-paced, outward-look-
ing economic development very critically – and in fact prevent it in the one country 
case in which they have a formal political say: Kuwait.2 Their core concern in this 
is protecting their national and cultural identity – a hotly debated issue in the region 
– to which many of  the region’s soft power projects appear to pose a particularly 
visible threat. 
As a result, leading proponents of  ‘liberal’ urban interventions like the Qatar Foundation 
(QF) or the Qatar Museums Authority (QM) have come under attack even in the tame 
local media. Columnists have called for the employment of  more Qataris in the QM, and 
a poll in a journal published by the QF itself  showed that a majority of  readers think that 
Western education – which the QF has been introducing forcefully in the country – will 
water down Qatari identity.
At the same time, the ambition of  the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar in partic-
ular to style themselves as beacons of  cultural and scientific progress creates reputational 
risks in the international arena. It is quite likely that labour practices in Abu Dhabi and 
Qatar would have drawn less international attention were it not for Qatar’s hosting of  the 
2022 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup or Abu Dhabi’s 
highly visible Guggenheim, Louvre and New York University (NYU) campus projects.
2 Michael Herb, ‘A Nation of  Bureaucrats: Political Participation and Economic Diversification in 
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates’, International Journal of  Middle East Studies 41/3 (2009), pp. 375–95. 
Michael Herb, The Wages of  Oil: Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2014).
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The GCC countries remain largely unintegrated into international civil and human rights 
regimes, and their domestic political practices are at odds with international political and 
civil rights norms. In many ways, the higher profile they have achieved with their soft 
power initiatives has made their domestic non-compliance with important international 
norms more visible and problematic.
The rest of  the paper will explain this puzzle by relating it to the broader logic of 
state-building in the GCC in the post-World War II era. I will argue that the soft power 
urban enclaves are just the most recent example of  a segmentation process in which 
elites have used rents to create radically different, parallel state institutions that function 
according to different rules, cater to different social and economic constituencies and 
often control their own territory and infrastructure. What makes the soft power enclaves 
different, and potentially problematic, is that by design they are supposed to irradiate 
beyond their boundaries.
The paper first provides a historical discussion of  the broader political economy that 
has made enclave development and spatial segmentation in the GCC possible. It then 
describes the institutional basis of  different types of  urban enclaves in the GCC, then pro-
vides a series of  short case studies that distinguish first-generation ‘commercial’ enclaves, 
pioneered in different ways by Dubai and Saudi Arabia, from second-generation ‘soft 
power’ enclave projects pursued predominantly by Abu Dhabi and Qatar, but also to 
a lesser extent Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. This is followed by a discussion of  the likely 
motivations that drive local elites to pursue ambitious and in many ways high-risk soft 
power projects. A short conclusion discusses the viability and exportability of  the Gulf 
enclave model.
Historical Background: Elite Agency and State-Building  
in the GCC
To understand state-building and the shaping of  urban space in the GCC, we need to 
recognise the disproportionate role of  elite agency in the process. The existence and 
importance of  individual ministries and public companies, of  whole city quarters and 
sometimes whole cities is often an outcome less of  broader political processes than of  the 
tastes, whims and conflicts among a small number of  princes and sheikhs. The key to 
understanding the role and shape of  the huge Saudi Ministry of  Defence with its military 
cities is knowing the role of  Prince Sultan, who was minister from 1962 until his death in 
2011; Abu Dhabi’s huge state company and urban developer Mubadala is similarly insep-
arable from its patron Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayed; and the same is true of  the 
QF and its patron Sheikha Moza, mother of  Qatar’s current ruler.
The reasons why elite agency looms so large in the creation of  the institutions described 
in this paper are themselves structural: the rentier status of  GCC countries has given 
ruling families and their advisors a high level of  political autonomy at critical junctures of 
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state-building.3 Not only have rulers had direct control over rapidly growing, externally 
derived state income and over state lands around and inside of  rapidly growing cities; they 
have also faced few organised constraints on their decision-making. With the exception 
of  Kuwait, GCC ruling elites do not face strong constraints from formal mechanisms of 
political participation. As importantly, traditional status groups that were able to negoti-
ate with rulers in the pre-oil age, be they tribes or merchant families, have lost much of 
their cohesion and most of  their social and economic autonomy in the course of  rentier 
state-building, when pretty nigh everyone in local society became dependent on state 
largess of  one form or the other.4 The lack of  organised resistance to the state and the 
extent of  individual dependence on state largesse are arguably the most pronounced in 
Abu Dhabi and Qatar. 
Elite agency matters particularly during periods of  high oil surpluses when new, uncom-
mitted funds become available to elites. High autonomy and low short-term economic 
and political opportunity costs give elites considerable space for institutional experimenta-
tion. There are no truly serious negative consequences of  project failures in the short run. 
‘Hub and Spoke’ State-Building
But why have GCC policy experiments often taken the particular shape of  institutional 
and spatial enclaves? Elite autonomy and surpluses have combined with two further factors 
to produce a fragmented institutional and spatial landscape in GCC countries: the need to 
accommodate various parts of  the national population through public employment and, 
at least at times, the plural nature of  leadership in Gulf  monarchies.
GCC governments have felt historically compelled to share a substantial proportion of 
their wealth with their national populations. The most important channel for this has been 
surplus employment in the public sector. This has meant rapid growth of  state institutions 
and in many cases recruitment with scant regard to institutional needs and substantive 
qualifications, often limiting the capacity of  the new bureaucracies.5 In some cases, elites 
have also used particular government institutions to co-opt specific social constituencies, 
such as tribesmen in particular sections of  the security forces and religious interests in new 
educational and judicial institutions, especially but not only in Saudi Arabia. This has 
further reduced the coherence of  the state apparatus.
3 Hussein Mahdavy, ‘Patterns and Problems of  Economic Development in Rentier States’, in 
M. A. Cook (ed.), Studies in the Economic History of  the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). 
Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qata (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). Giacomo Luciani, ‘Allocation Vs. Production States’, in Hazem Beblawi and 
Giacomo Luciani (eds.), The Rentier State (London: Croom Helm, 1987). Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo 
Luciani (eds.), The Rentier State (London and New York: Croom Helm, 1987).
4 Crystal, Oil and Politics. Steffen Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia 
(Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2010).
5 Steffen Hertog, ‘The Post-WWII Consolidation of  Gulf  Nation-States: Oil and Nation-Building’, in 
J. Peterson (ed.), The Emergence of  the Gulf  States (London: Bloomsbury, 2016).
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Patronage employment has imposed constraints on the efficacy and coherence of  large 
parts of  the mainline state apparatus. As a result, in times of  oil surpluses ruling elites have 
often resorted to building yet more parallel, but more selectively recruited, more leanly 
staffed and (even) better financed ‘pockets of  efficiency’ alongside the rest of  the state, often 
functioning under their own laws and regulations.6 These have been tasked with high-pri-
ority policies and projects, be it banking regulation, building of  heavy industry, creation of 
free zones – or the building of  soft power urban enclaves, the topic of  this paper.
The creation of  new organisations for new clienteles and priority projects has often been 
accompanied by new, parallel urban infrastructures attached to the new institutions and 
their employees – a continuing process. When King Abdullah initiated judicial reforms 
in Saudi Arabia in the mid-2000s, one of  the first follow-up announcements was that the 
government would create new ‘judicial cities’ attached to the new courts. Similarly, the 
building of  new city quarters and ‘cities’ was a key component of  the economic diversifi-
cation projects initiated by Abu Dhabi’s state holding Mubadala in the 2000s. Institutional 
fragmentation has led to spatial fragmentation.
The creation of  parallel institutional fiefdoms and spatial enclaves has been exacerbated 
by intra-elite competition and the need to accommodate new generations within ruling 
families. In Saudi Arabia, following the death of  founder King Abdulaziz, senior sons of 
his created or attained control of  parallel security organisations in the Ministry of  Defence 
and Civil Aviation, the Ministry of  Interior and the National Guard from the 1950s on, 
and all of  these institutions subsequently created their own residential cities with their own 
large-scale housing estates, sports facilities, universities and – often top-notch – hospitals 
outside of  the weak public health system. Commoner-led agencies often replicated this 
pattern on a smaller scale as they found it difficult to rely on other line agencies for infra-
structure and service provision, while themselves commanding sizeable surplus budgets.
Rent-financed state-building in the Gulf  oil monarchies has been both top-down and 
deeply fragmented, serving very different political purposes and social clienteles: tribes, 
the modern middle classes, technocratic elites, religious groups, high-skilled expatriates or 
low-skilled expatriates of  different nationalities, etc. Most of  these operate in their own 
urban enclaves – often though not always attached to different state institutions – and live 
according to very different social rules and sometimes laws. 
The Gulf ’s oil monarchies present an unusual mix of  quite powerful central states that 
can reach deep into individuals’ lives (as modern nation-states do) and the parallel 
existence of  social, ethnic and legal enclaves (a characteristic of  pre-modern empires). 
The GCC monarchies never experienced a historical moment such as a struggle for inde-
pendence or a social or industrial revolution that would have moulded different social 
groups into a more integrated whole. Instead, the oil booms have in many ways led to 
further segmentation. The recent soft power projects are just one particularly visible 
output of  a larger process of  enclave-building.
6 Barbara Geddes, Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996). Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats.
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The Institutional Framework for Urban Enclave Projects
The soft power projects draw on an older model of  commercial enclaves that has existed 
since at least the 1970s in the shape of  ‘free zones’ and spatially segregated infrastruc-
tures run by state-owned enterprises. These commercial enclaves themselves are just one 
sub-type of  state-created enclaves, which as mentioned can also include military cities, 
ministerial compounds with their own education and health systems, etc. This paper does 
not engage with such other enclaves in detail, however, as they are less relevant as a model 
for the soft power projects.
GCC Free Zones
The basic institutional principle that enables the development of  commercial enclave 
projects in the GCC is the existence of  parallel regulatory spheres that are separate from 
the rest of  government in both formal and informal ways. The purpose is usually to cir-
cumvent the constraints and inefficiencies of  the existing state apparatus.
Dubai has pioneered the ‘free zone’ as the archetypical regulatory enclave in the region. 
Free zones allowing tariff-free imports and full foreign ownership of  business exist in many 
emerging markets but rarely do they enjoy as far-reaching legal autonomy as in Dubai. 
Zones there have their own company licensing regimes and are not subject to core parts 
of  the national labour legislation: free zone workers do not labour under the country’s 
much-discussed sponsorship system and companies are not subject to Emiratisation rules. 
The Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) even has its own separate laws and 
court system (mostly staffed by retired British judges).
Unlike most other emerging markets, many free zones in the GCC are located in central 
urban areas (e.g. DIFC, Dubai Healthcare City, and Jumeirah Lake Towers (JLT) Free 
Zone in Dubai; the twofour54 media city in Abu Dhabi; Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) in 
Qatar). They are often tied to large-scale urban developments that provide office space as 
well as luxury real estate for predominantly foreign buyers, who are typically not allowed 
to acquire property outside of  the zones. The zones have moved far beyond the geographic 
model of  remote industrial enclaves or international logistics hubs that the region’s first 
free zones followed in the 1970s and 1980s and that still characterises most free zones in 
the rest of  the world.
Free zones are not only spatial enclaves with their own infrastructure, but constitute par-
allel economies and, in many ways, governments. Their swift administration and outward 
orientation contrast with the much less accessible ‘onshore’, even in a supposedly busi-
ness-oriented economy like the UAE: administration outside of  the free zones is often 
slower moving and business largely reserved to nationals. The UAE, for example, con-
tinues to limit foreign ownership of  onshore companies to a maximum of  49 per cent. 
This provision is more restrictive than in any other GCC country; new federal company 
legislation issued in 2013 after more than a decade of  discussion was supposed to liberalise 
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it but in the end failed to do so. Onshore business is only possible through joint ventures 
with (often silent) national partners. Larger businesses are mostly in the hands of  tra-
ditional merchant families. National ‘ownership’, both in an economic and in a spatial 
sense, is larger outside of  the enclaves. 
State-Owned Enterprises
Another vehicle that has helped enclave-building projects in the GCC is the state-owned 
enterprise (SOE), an entity that sometimes overlaps or even is identical with the free zones. 
SOEs have been the primary tool of  economic diversification in the GCC but in many 
cases are also tasked with developing projects that do not have a primarily economic ratio-
nale, including hospitals, universities, museums or government stadiums – usually outside 
of  the purview of  government agencies formally in charge of  such infrastructure. 
SOEs tend to be created in times of  oil surpluses. While the region also has its share 
of  overstaffed and inefficient SOEs, the GCC’s top SOEs typically concentrate a crit-
ical mass of  managerial expertise that is lacking in many conventional government 
bodies.7 The highest profile Gulf  SOEs are led by close confidants of  rulers that also 
have modern managerial training; Khaldoon Al Mubarak of  Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala 
is perhaps the most prominent example: he holds an economics and finance degree 
from Tufts, but is also from a prominent family and personally close to Crown Prince 
Mohammed bin Zayed (as a result of  partially growing up at the ruler’s court after his 
father, a UAE ambassador to France, was killed in 1984). Mubadala has served as prime 
vehicle for the development ambitions of  the Crown Prince and was created at a time 
when he reportedly did not yet have full control of  Abu Dhabi’s general budget and 
overseas assets. Other GCC SOEs and state holdings are often similarly affiliated with 
specific ruling family factions.
Leading SOEs operate separately from the rest of  the government, with independent 
budgets and their own, more competitive and less egalitarian salary and human resources 
structures. Unlike the mainline administration, they provide fewer patronage jobs for 
citizens and can recruit relatively selectively, including on the international market. 
They often enjoy de facto monopolies and other regulatory privileges; UAE SOEs, for 
example, are exempt from the national company code. In a situation of  rent surpluses, the 
SOE model allows governments to build critical implementation capacity in some parts 
of  the state apparatus quickly, while using other parts of  it to provide surplus jobs for less 
qualified or motivated nationals.8 The resulting institutional redundancy and parallelism 
only become a concern when fiscal resources become scarce.
7 Steffen Hertog, ‘Defying the Resource Curse: Explaining Successful State-Owned Enterprises in 
Rentier States’, World Politics 62/2 (2010), pp. 261–301. doi:10.1017/S0043887110000055.
8 Hertog, ‘Defying the Resource Curse’. Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats.
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It is often autonomous SOEs or companies with strong shareholding by ruling family 
members that organise public space: State-owned airlines, for example, control import-
ant parts of  urban space with their own segregated housing for expatriate employees. 
Companies like Mubadala and Aldar in Abu Dhabi, Emaar and Nakheel in Dubai, or 
Diar and Barwa in Qatar develop new city areas or whole new cities – and in many cases 
also are owners and regulators of  the new spaces, while enjoying considerable autonomy 
from other government agencies thanks to princely patronage. Infrastructure outside of 
SOE-controlled urban enclaves is typically the responsibility of  less nimble onshore agen-
cies such as municipalities or departments of  transport, housing, social affairs etc. 
Successes and Spread of the Commercial Enclave Model
It is useful to divide enclave projects into commercial initiatives – like pretty much all zones, 
specialised ‘cities’ etc. in Dubai – and initiatives with a broader social, cultural or ‘soft 
power’ mandate, like the more recent projects in Abu Dhabi and Qatar. Dubai’s commer-
cial enclaves, whether more traditional free zones like Jebel Ali or regulatory free zones cum 
urban mega-projects like the DIFC, by and large fulfil their function successfully. Depend-
ing on the source, between a quarter and a third of  Dubai’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
is generated in free zones, and many of  them obtain top spots in international rankings.
While the attempt to create a new international stock exchange through Nasdaq Dubai 
has failed, the DIFC has become one of  the region’s foremost hubs for consulting and 
banking more broadly. Its courts have become a go-to destination for litigants who want 
to avoid not only the UAE’s but the whole Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region’s 
opaque ‘onshore’ court systems. While the DIFC courts were initially perceived as based 
on shaky legal grounds (requiring an amendment to the federal constitution as well as 
memoranda with local courts to enable enforcement of  verdicts), their extraterritorial 
arbitration services, drawing on British common law rather than the ageing Egyptian–
French system practised onshore, have proven popular. Dubai’s ruler Mohammed bin 
Rashid has managed to build a wholly separate judicial system while keeping Dubai as an 
integral part of  the UAE.
Dubai’s free zone model has been copied all around the region: Abu Dhabi now has 
four free zones that in principle offer 100 per cent foreign ownership and has recently 
created the Abu Dhabi Global Market, which is modelled on the DIFC and located on 
Al Maryah Island (formerly known as Sowwah Island), an urban mega-project developed 
by Mubadala. Bahrain, Oman and Qatar have also created various special economic or 
free zones, usually in combination with large-scale, state-developed office and residential 
projects catering to foreign demand. 
The QFC, set up in 2005 just one year after the DIFC, goes perhaps the furthest in pro-
viding separate regulatory structures, operating under its own labour and immigration 
rules as well as its own court and arbitration system. Unlike the case with the DIFC, com-
panies registered with the QFC do not have to be physically present in it.
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Saudi Arabia has also recently started to follow the Dubai model of  developing integrated 
residential and commercial communities, in the shape of  the King Abdullah Financial Dis-
trict in Riyadh and the King Abdullah Economic City near Jeddah. Unlike Dubai’s, however, 
these new projects have not been able to acquire proper free zone status due to the resistance 
of  established government agencies. Together with the much stronger cultural constraints on 
expatriate life in Saudi Arabia, this has cast doubt on their economic prospects.
Saudi Arabia does in fact have its own successful tradition of  SOE-led enclave develop-
ment, but this is limited to industry: its national oil company Aramco, which has inherited 
its corporate culture and organisation from its previous American owners, is by far the 
Kingdom’s most efficient institution.9 It enjoys a high level of  operational autonomy and 
owns separate American-style residential cities with their own educational and health 
infrastructure, in which English is the language of  work and women are allowed to unveil 
and drive – privileges the ruling family has repeatedly defended against criticism from the 
Kingdom’s conservative religious lobby.
Since the 1970s, Saudi Arabia has also built two world-scale ‘industrial cities’ in Jubail and 
Yanbu, which are regulated by a separate Royal Commission and have their own training 
institutes, hospitals and utility company. On its inception in 1974, the Royal Commis-
sion, operating under the patronage of  then Minister of  Interior (and later king) Prince 
Fahd, was given an explicit mandate to avoid other government bureaucracy. Most of  the 
production facilities of  Saudi Arabia’s largely state-owned chemicals giant SABIC are 
located in Jubail and Yanbu.10 These are purely functional company towns, however, that 
lie far away from established cities and have no ambition to provide high-class residen-
tial real estate, office space or any other kind of  spectacular architecture for either locals 
or foreigners.
Dubai’s free zones introduced the model of  urban commercial enclaves. The neighbour-
ing sheikhdoms that have adapted it have, however, pushed the model far beyond its 
purely commercial purpose. The new ‘soft power’ enclaves in Abu Dhabi, Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia aim less at offering international business a hospitable environment dis-
connected from the onshore. Instead, they use oil rents to create separate cultural and 
normative spheres that operate in parallel with the rest of  state and local society – circum-
venting cultural and normative constraints of  local society as much as purely logistical 
ones. By the same token, their intended audience, and the tastes they cater to, seem to be 
international more than domestic.
9 Thomas Lippman, Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia (Boulder, CO: West-
view Press, 2004). Steffen Hertog, ‘Petromin: The Slow Death of  Statist Oil Development in Saudi 
Arabia’, Business History 50/5 (2008), pp. 645–67. doi:10.1080/00076790802246087.
10 Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats.
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The New ‘Soft Power’ Enclaves11
Dubai does also pay attention to its image beyond the commercial realm and its ruler has 
created a number of  high-profile, internationally active charities. It is fiscally much more 
constrained than Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, however, and its urban develop-
ments all have a primarily commercial purpose – including its new ‘humanitarian city’, 
which at the core is meant as a logistics hub for regionally active aid and relief  organisations.
Renewable Energy
The commercial rationale for some of  the region’s ambitious renewable energy projects 
outside of  Dubai is much less obvious. The most ambitious of  them, Masdar City in Abu 
Dhabi, was announced in 2006 as the world’s first zero-carbon city. While many econo-
mists have made a case for the use of  solar energy in the GCC region, it appears clear that 
Masdar’s wider zero-carbon target was conceived before its commercial feasibility was 
assessed. Its purpose was symbolic and the audience international. 
The project, administered by a daughter company of  Mubadala and planned by Foster & 
Partners, has been repeatedly scaled back since its announcement, and the Masdar Free 
Zone seems to have attracted few international tenants so far. One important local tenant 
is the Masdar Institute, an enclave university whose motto is ‘Learning to change the 
world’. Another key tenant on the edge of  the Masdar City campus is the International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), the hosting rights for which Abu Dhabi managed 
to win thanks to an intense international lobbying campaign among developing countries, 
beating competition from Germany and Austria. The 32,000 m2 IRENA headquarters 
are billed as the ‘greenest office building in the UAE’.
The professed environmental ethos of  Masdar is dramatically at odds with ingrained 
‘onshore’ energy consumption habits, building practices and industrial structures that 
Gulf  regimes have to date left largely untouched. Per capita CO2 emissions in Abu Dhabi 
and Qatar are the highest in the world, and electricity provision for national house-
holds remains heavily subsidised in most GCC countries, encouraging excessive levels of 
demand. New York Times architecture critic Nicolai Ouroussoff  has termed Masdar a gated 
community that reflects ‘the growing division of  the world into refined, high-end enclaves 
and vast formless ghettos where issues like sustainability have little immediate relevance’.12 
While ‘ghetto’ might not capture the nature of  the UAE onshore, its social distance from 
Masdar could hardly be larger.
11 This section only deals with soft power initiatives that have a clear spatial and urbanistic dimension. 
Others, such as the UAE’s Mars mission, the operations of  international charities, inter-faith, renew-
ables and humanitarian conferences and organisations, etc. are not discussed here.
12 Nicolai Ouroussoff, ‘In Arabian Desert, a Sustainable City Rises’, New York Times, 25 September 
2010. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/arts/design/26masdar.html (accessed 
14 September 2016).
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Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KACARE), 
announced as a separate administrative entity in 2010, has received less international 
press than Masdar City. In addition to researching and developing renewable energy in 
the Kingdom, it has the relatively mundane task of  developing civilian nuclear energy. 
It does, however, follow the GCC enclave model in that it was created in parallel with 
existing government agencies in charge of  domestic energy matters, and in its plan to 
build a separate ‘sustainable city’ near Riyadh. Its publicly announced $109-billion plan 
to deploy 41 gigawatt of  solar capacity by 2032 – amounting to a third of  total Saudi elec-
tricity generation by then – also seems to have been an outward-oriented signal as much as 
a concrete plan, coming at a time when the Kingdom had come under increasing pressure 
in the context of  international climate negotiations. 
The solar capacity target date has since been pushed back to 2040 and renewables in 
Saudi Arabia, which continues to provide domestic fuel and electricity at very low prices, 
still lack a clear regulatory framework. Like the King Abdullah Economic City, KACARE 
has run into resistance from other agencies in an institutional landscape that is older and 
more cluttered and where decision-making is relatively less centralised than in the King-
dom’s smaller neighbours.
Museums 
Perhaps the most-discussed soft power enclaves in the GCC are the new museums. 
The biggest institution already established is the Museum of  Islamic Art in Doha, planned 
by IM Pei and administered by the QM, which operates in parallel with the older Ministry 
of  Culture, Arts and Heritage. The QM was created in 2005 and since 2006 has been 
headed by Sheikha Al Mayassa Al Thani, born in 1983 and a sister of  the current ruler, 
giving it a particularly high profile.
We referred above to some of  the flak that the QM has attracted in local media. 
While one might imagine Islamic art to be of  interest to the local population, at least 
anecdotally the museum draws limited crowds mostly existing of  expatriates. The wider 
activities of  the QM, including the Doha Tribeca film festival and the installation of  sculp-
tures by international artists (several of  which were removed after local protests, as they 
depicted nudity or violence), reveal an alignment with international rather than local tastes.
This alignment is even more visible in the case of  the Guggenheim and Louvre projects 
in Abu Dhabi, led by the state-owned Tourism Development & Investment Company 
(TDIC). The museums have run over budget and been much delayed yet are scheduled 
to open in 2017. They are part of  a broader bid to make Abu Dhabi a hub for high-class 
international tourism, but also – like Masdar – to brand it as a progressive state on a par 
with leading Western cultural and economic powers. Given the huge cost of  the projects, 
the commercial rationale seems quite speculative, while the branding aspect thus far has 
mostly backfired, as the projects have attracted much critical attention from international 
labour rights advocates.
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As a result of  criticism from Human Rights Watch and others, developers involved with 
the museum projects have pledged to adhere to labour standards above and beyond those 
that generally apply in the UAE – separate standards that themselves confirm the enclave 
nature of  the projects. It is, however, not clear how well these standards can be enforced, 
given that the subcontractors on the projects are mostly ‘onshore’ businesses potentially 
deploying some of  the same workers in other projects with lower standards.
A further reaction to improve the lot of  workers on high-profile construction projects 
has been to build new, separate housing enclaves for them to replace substandard worker 
housing, a task undertaken by big SOEs like Diar in Qatar and Zonescorp and Arabtec in 
Abu Dhabi. At the same time, the Qatari Ministry of  Municipality and Urban Planning 
has published maps with ‘no-go’ areas for single expatriate workers, indicating urban 
quarters in which they are not to be housed and often are not allowed to enter facilities 
like shopping malls or attend public events. The answer to both international criticisms 
and local demands to preserve national identity seems to be more regulatory and spatial 
segmentation.
Universities and Research
The final main area of  urban soft power enclaves is that of  new, internationally branded 
and outward-oriented university projects. The Gulf  has had separate, private universities 
for children of  expatriate residents for several decades, notably in Bahrain and in Dubai’s 
International Academic City. These have had limited international visibility, however, are 
pure teaching institutions and operate on a commercial basis.
Qatar Foundation
It is Qatar which has taken the lead on outward-oriented enclave universities in its ‘Edu-
cation City’, a campus operated by the QF – a sprawling institution under the control of 
the current emir’s mother Sheikha Moza that, like the QM under her daughter Sheikha 
Al Mayassa, has pursued a broader agenda of  high culture, research and community 
development with strong international involvement.13 The institution is not bashful about 
its ambitions of  international leadership; its motto is ‘Qatar Foundation – Encouraging 
the people of  the world to start thinking’. It regularly hosts high-profile international 
conferences about education and welfare issues at which it awards international prizes; in 
2010 it signed a €170-million sponsorship deal with FC Barcelona, placing its name on 
the shirts of  Barca players (since replaced with the name of  Qatar Airways).
The Foundation’s Education City houses large branches of  Georgetown, Texas A&M, 
Carnegie Mellon, Northwestern, France’s Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Uni-
versity College London, Weill Cornell Medical College and Virginia Commonwealth 
University. Professors are almost invariably expatriates as are the majority of  students, a 
13 Sheikha Moza is also chairperson of  Msheireb Properties, a state-owned entity in charge of  redevel-
oping central Doha (a project formerly known as ‘Dohaland’).
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subject of  some discontent in Qatari society and a result of  both a small local population 
and an ‘onshore’ schooling system that – despite reforms attempts led by the RAND 
Corporation and the Supreme Education Council, of  which Sheikha Moza used to be 
Vice Chair – does not sufficiently prepare students for academic work. Education City 
exists in parallel with the older Qatar University, which caters mostly to local students and 
has a higher proportion of  local faculty. In addition to Education City and a number of 
other impressive buildings, the QF controls Qatar Science & Technology Park (QSTP), 
Qatar’s first free trade zone, which was inaugurated in March 2009. Until recently, it was 
also working on the creation of  ‘Qatar Space City’ at Al Khor north of  Doha, a QAR 
12-billion project that plans to take passengers into space. The QF has undergone severe 
budget cuts with the lower oil prices and has announced no major new initiatives.
New York University Abu Dhabi 
The most visible and controversial international university enclave in the region to date 
has been NYU Abu Dhabi (NYUAD). In contrast to the various Education City trans-
plant universities with their relatively narrow disciplinary focus, NYUAD was conceived 
as a full liberal arts college offering a range of  disciplines. Even more than the Education 
City institutions, it has been outward-oriented, recruiting its students almost exclusively 
outside of  Abu Dhabi through a costly process that involves flying all prospective can-
didates over to Abu Dhabi for interviews and initially hosting them in local hotels (they 
are now housed on campus). NYUAD’s permanent campus is located at Saadiyat Island 
and was developed by Mubadala. Saadiyat is also the location of  the Guggenheim and 
Louvre transplant museums as well as a number of  planned high-class residential, enter-
tainment and tourism projects – one of  which Mubadala bought in June 2013 from the 
loss-making TDIC.
The very costly NYUAD project – pursued at a time when funds for some of  the UAE’s 
traditional onshore state universities were frozen or cut – has been much discussed in the 
international media. It has come under fire from NYU faculty in New York, one of  whom, 
Professor of  Social and Cultural Analysis Andrew Ross, was denied entry to Abu Dhabi in 
early 2015 after publishing articles critical of  labour practices on the campus construction 
site. Ross himself  has pointed out that a liberal arts university that is supposed to engage 
critically with social and political issues in the surrounding society cannot function in a 
segmented enclave.14 He has also publicly doubted the viability of  the agreement between 
NYUAD and the Abu Dhabi government that is supposed to guarantee free speech on 
campus, giving students and faculty a form of  extraterritorial status that privileges them 
over onshore residents and citizens of  the emirate.
14 Andrew Ross, ‘Human Rights, Academic Freedom, and Offshore Academics’, AAUP, 
January–February 2011. Available at http://www.aaup.org/article/human-rights-academic-free-
dom-and-offshore-academics#.VlPS2b8Szkw (accessed 14 September 2016).
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King Abdullah University of Science and Technology
In 2009 Saudi Arabia, a country whose social practices in many ways are even more at 
odds with Western campus life, created its own high-profile, outward-oriented enclave 
university: King Abdullah University of  Science and Technology (KAUST), endowed 
by then King Abdullah with a reported $20 billion and located on a new campus outside 
of  Jeddah with its own large-scale housing, schools, stadium, golf  course and hospital. 
The development of  KAUST was entrusted to enclave SOE Saudi Aramco and it initially 
operated separately from the Ministry of  Higher Education.15 KAUST is the only insti-
tution outside of  the Aramco compounds in the Eastern Province where ‘Aramco rules’ 
apply; that is, women can unveil and mix with men – made possible only by direct royal 
patronage of  the project and a source of  some controversy in Saudi society, particularly 
among the religious lobby. Three sons of  former King Abdullah (d. 2015) continue to 
serve on KAUST’s board, reflecting its continued links to this particular branch of  the 
ruling family.
KAUST has also come under strong criticism from a Saudi princess who has blamed it for 
catering to foreign elites rather than Saudis. It is currently headed by a former president 
of  the California Institute of  Technology, it has mostly expatriate faculty, and a majority 
of  its (generously funded) students are foreigners; by statute, Saudis are not allowed to 
constitute more than 50 per cent of  the student body. Like KACARE, KAUST is more of 
a hybrid institution that combines an outward-oriented mission of  international leader-
ship with significant local tasks of  building technology and engineering capacity in critical 
areas like energy and renewables. It has a relatively larger national student population to 
recruit from than the transplant universities in Abu Dhabi and Qatar.
The spectacularisation of  its architecture, the scale of  international outreach and public 
relations activities around its launch, and the weakness of  links to existing Saudi uni-
versities, however, suggest the importance of  international tastes and audiences in the 
conception of  the institution. If  the purpose had only been to improve local research 
capacity, it is not clear why this could not have been accomplished by strengthening a rel-
atively successful established institution like the King Fahd University of  Petroleum and 
Minerals in the Eastern Province, which is more selective than other Saudi universities 
and has traditionally been the main local recruiting ground for Aramco.
This paper could discuss further urban developments related to GCC regimes’ interna-
tional ambitions in sports and media, including the Formula 1 infrastructure in Bahrain 
and Abu Dhabi, FIFA 2022 in Qatar, Abu Dhabi’s twofour54 media city (whose associ-
ated international film festival was recently cancelled), etc. All these broadly follow the 
same template already illustrated in some detail: ambitious architecture, integrated res-
idential and commercial infrastructure that is physically segregated from the rest of  the 
urban landscape, direct patronage from rulers or senior princes, administrative and often 
15 Steffen Hertog, ‘Saudi Aramco as a National Development Agent’, NOREF Policy Brief, August 
2013. Available at http://noref.no/Regions/Middle-East-and-North-Africa/The-Gulf/Publications/
Saudi-Aramco-as-a-national-development-agent-recent-shifts (accessed 25 September 2016).
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legal separation from the rest of  the state, a leading role for autonomous local SOEs and 
international consultants in their development, an ambition to cater to an international 
rather than a local audience, and questionable commercial viability. No project of  this 
kind existed before the early 2000s; now the region is littered with dozens of  them.
Results
The second generation soft power urban enclaves have either had no commercial ambi-
tions at all, as is the case with the transplant universities, or have to date been unsuccessful 
in realising them. By 2011, foreigners had bought only 62 apartments in Qatar’s free 
zones (established through a 2004 law), and for several years now the Qatari government 
has pondered a plan to reintegrate the QFC into the emirate’s onshore financial market 
(the Qatar Stock Exchange) due to lack of  business. Many of  the leading state-related 
companies that have been the primary drivers of  enclave projects have required govern-
ment bailouts, despite privileged access to lands and contracts as well as (in several cases) 
part-ownership by members of  the ruling family. Cases include Barwa in Qatar as well as 
Abu Dhabi’s TDIC, Aldar and Sorouh (the latter two of  which were merged in 2013 in 
the wake of  significant losses). Many of  the more ambitious urban and free zone projects 
announced since the mid-2000s have been either downscaled or abandoned since the 
early 2010s.
The Renaissance Man among the region’s SOEs, Mubadala, has also incurred losses in 
several years. More importantly, it appears that it has only one main source of  profits: the 
hydrocarbons-focused Dolphin project, which has allowed it to import gas cheaply from 
Qatar and resell it more dearly on international markets. Its other business divisions have 
been weighed down by ambitious but ill-timed international acquisitions in semiconductors 
and commodities as well as costly aerospace manufacturing projects, through which Abu 
Dhabi hopes to leapfrog into a position of  international technology leadership. A good 
share of  Mubadala’s local revenue derived from the enclave projects mentioned above 
seems to be based on land grants and exclusive development contracts with government.
It is not clear that there has been more success in achieving the soft power enclaves’ 
non-commercial objectives in social development, sustainability, research or improving 
educational output in terms of  either local impact or international reputation. Attempts 
to build research and development, high-tech capabilities and world-class universities 
have been undercut by deficient local education systems that the enclave projects have 
done nothing to fix – or that they try to work around by offering additional ‘gap year’ 
pre-university training. And while some of  the enclaves pursue advanced social and envi-
ronmental policies such as building to a high environmental standard (that of  Leadership 
in Energy and Environmental Design, or LEED), this is usually a result of  centralised 
decisions by the SOE developer in charge and does not seem to have spilled over to the 
onshore to date. Cultural projects have barely found a local audience and created contro-
versy among international labour advocates.
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Even if  local spill-overs are not intended – as might be the case with NYUAD – the social 
and cultural messages that the new soft projects embody are more difficult to contain than 
the offshore economic activities in traditional free zone enclaves. While often met with 
indifference from onshore national society, some of  the enclaves have also created local 
friction in otherwise politically placid societies.
Why Does it Happen?
Why do regimes pursue ambitious soft power enclave projects in the face of  what are 
arguably long odds of  success and potentially considerable social, economic and polit-
ical costs? Conventional explanations based on economic and strategic rationality do 
not work well. Not only have we seen that the commercial rationale of  many projects 
is questionable but, at least for the small, rich sheikhdoms of  Abu Dhabi and Qatar, 
the long-term viability of  their states would be more easily secured by accumulating 
diversified overseas assets that could generate a permanent revenue stream. That has 
been happening to an important extent during the post-2000 boom but could have hap-
pened on a larger scale were it not for the huge local outlays involved in many of  the 
enclave projects. 
One might also argue that commercially questionable large projects provide a good oppor-
tunity for elite rent-seeking. While this might be true for some of  the projects, it would be 
much easier to pocket money through less visible infrastructure contracting and land deals 
that do not involve high-profile clean energy, research and culture projects that expose 
the country to international scrutiny. Rulers of  the sub-Saharan African petro-states like 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Angola have managed to enrich themselves colossally 
without going to the trouble of  building international universities or museums. 
Some scholars think that building large-scale projects with Western involvement gives 
foreign powers a stronger stake in the survival of  GCC regimes. This is probably true 
when it comes to the energy sector and defence contracting. Western stakeholders in 
museum, university or renewable technology projects, however, would appear to have 
little influence over Western security strategies – and if  anything the increased attention 
devoted to the Gulf  in the wake of  its soft power policies has made the public defence of 
GCC–Western alliances harder.
This paper proposes a more constructivist, if  still preliminary, explanation of  the soft 
power strategy. The GCC track record is most consistent with local ruling elites’ quest 
for social recognition and status in international society, even if  there is no immediate 
strategic rationale for such recognition. Building soft power infrastructure is best under-
stood as a quest to acquire post-oil statehood that would give the rentier monarchies an 
international identity and status independent of  their role as hydrocarbons producers. 
What shines through all of  the projects is the ambition to be taken seriously as a state that 
can exert some sort of  non-oil cultural and economic leadership.
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This elite-driven ambition appears analogous to what happens in the second and third 
generation of  many family business dynasties around the world. While the first-generation 
founders build family wealth, subsequent generations often realise that wealth as such 
does not buy social respect, and hence branch out into charitable, cultural and civil society 
activities to acquire social and cultural capital for their family – think of  the Rockefellers, 
Vanderbilts or Langhorne Astors in the US. The great autonomy that their inherited 
wealth provides makes this strategy easy to pursue, and it is often boosted by the social 
ambitions of  family members and heirs not directly involved in the core business. 
It is notable that in both Qatar and the UAE the high-profile soft power policies began 
with new leaders from the second post-oil generation of  rulers, and many of  the initia-
tives have clearly been personal pet projects. Competition and copycat behaviour among 
Gulf  regimes would also appear to be similar to what can occur between leading business 
dynasties. And like business dynasties, Gulf  ruling families have a particular penchant for 
endowing buildings and infrastructure; physical monuments that permanently embody 
their social ambitions.
This explanation relies to a large degree on leadership psychology and agency. There is 
some existing research demonstrating the importance of  GCC leaders’ personal world-
view and desires for how they shape their educational and cultural policies: Calvert Jones 
has documented how GCC rulers’ personal experience and infatuation with liberal edu-
cation in the West makes them pursue local reform projects in secondary education that 
appear at odds with the GCC social and political environment. (The research also shows 
that local students admitted to this selective education actually develop more of  a sense of 
rentier entitlement.)16 
We have seen that leaders’ agency plays a particularly pronounced role in GCC state-build-
ing more broadly, particularly at times of  high oil prices. Great political autonomy from 
local societies and large fiscal reserves allow leaders to indulge their pet projects to seek 
social recognition.
It is indeed the political autonomy of  ruling sheikhs and the oil cycle that together best 
explain the timing and degree of  experimentation with soft power enclaves among GCC 
cases. The lack of  organised political resistance from society and the extent of  individual 
dependence on state largesse are most pronounced in Abu Dhabi and Qatar, which have 
also seen the most daring soft power enclave experiments. Kuwait, the one GCC country 
with strongly organised social constituencies that have access to formal decision-making, 
is also the one case with no large-scale soft power projects and limited economic diversi-
fication initiatives more broadly: parliament and organised interests in the public sector 
have made sure that most state resources are instead used for distribution to the mid-
dle-class citizenry.17 
16 Calvert W. Jones, ‘Seeing Like an Autocrat: Liberal Social Engineering in an Illiberal State’, 
Perspectives on Politics 13/1 (2015), pp. 24–41. doi:10.1017/S1537592714003119.
17 Herb, The Wages of  Oil.
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Outside of  Kuwait, the autonomy to initiate new projects has correlated strongly with 
fiscal surpluses. When deficits accrue and project spending enters into rivalry with 
broader patronage spending on the population, the latter invariably takes precedence. 
Accordingly, during the lean years of  the 1980s and 1990s, broad-based spending on sala-
ries and transfers to nationals progressively crowded out project spending across the region. 
Only when oil prices increase do ruling elites regain autonomy to decide what to do with 
new surpluses. This explains why both the older commercial enclaves in Saudi Arabia, like 
the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu or SABIC, and the region’s more recent soft 
power enclaves came into being during periods of  high oil prices and fiscal surplus. 
Given the post-2014 oil price environment, this leads us to expect few new large-scale 
projects in the foreseeable future. Almost no major new projects have been announced 
since 2014 and some existing ones – notably at the QF – have been put on hold or are 
being downsized. When GCC rulers face ‘normal’ fiscal constraints, their political choices 
become more normal too, and their urban strategies less experimental and ambitious.
Conclusion: What is Special about GCC Soft  
Power Enclaves?
The Gulf ’s soft power enclaves are not the only spaces in the region that function accord-
ing to their own rules and cater to specific social clienteles. They seem to leave local 
society behind in a particularly stark and visible fashion, however. In the GCC context, 
it is difficult to imagine elites pursing their hyper-modern cultural and educational ambi-
tions in anything but an enclave fashion: GCC countries are social, legal and economic 
late developers; most of  onshore society was untouched by modern education, media 
and consumption until a few decades ago. Nationals have seen dizzying social and demo-
graphic change; concern about the loss of  national identity, Westernisation and rule by 
expatriates is acute, particularly in the high-rent countries of  the UAE and Qatar.18
The political economy of  GCC regimes, with their high level of  political and fiscal 
autonomy, makes them uniquely suited for cultural enclave experiments led by local and 
foreign elites that are part of  a globalised cultural sphere. But these countries’ ‘onshore’ 
political and social structures provide little fertile ground for these experiments to spread 
locally. Tensions between the enclaves’ socio-cultural missions and onshore norms have 
repeatedly come to the surface. Enclaves are easier to separate from the rest if  they limit 
themselves to commercial activities; cultural and educational activities that are at least in 
principle predicated on openness and diffusion are bound to interact with the onshore, 
even if  the main outcome is friction.
18 Ibid.
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While the ideas and language informing GCC soft power enclaves are often borrowed 
from the West, their political economy context is very specific to the GCC. This suggests 
that unless the template is modified significantly, the new urban enclaves could be hard to 
export to other jurisdictions where elites have less fiscal and political autonomy, where local 
societies are larger and better organised and the needs of  the ‘onshore’ therefore more dif-
ficult to circumvent. It is telling that the one country which has attempted to adopt several 
of  the aspects of  the Gulf  enclave model is Kazakhstan: it is being actively consulted by 
Dubai in its plans to create a DIFC-style financial centre with its own court system, and 
its attempts to host the winter Olympics and the FIFA World Cup are reminiscent of  Abu 
Dhabi’s and Qatar’s soft power events and infrastructure strategies. Kazakhstan is an 
authoritarian, family-controlled rentier state with a short history of  independence – if  the 
GCC template can be fully replicated anywhere, it might be there. Given recent oil price 
developments, however, the short age of  new cultural mega-projects might be coming to 
a close even in the Gulf  itself. 
24 A Quest for Significance
Bibliography
Beblawi, Hazem, and Giacomo Luciani (eds), The Rentier State (London and New York: Croom Helm, 
1987).
Crystal, Jill, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995).
Geddes, Barbara, Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996).
Herb, Michael, ‘A Nation of  Bureaucrats: Political Participation and Economic Diversification in 
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates’, International Journal of  Middle East Studies 41/3 (2009), pp. 
375–95.
Herb, Michael, The Wages of  Oil: Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2014).
Hertog, Steffen, ‘Petromin: The Slow Death of  Statist Oil Development in Saudi Arabia’, Business 
History 50/5 (2008), pp. 645–67. doi:10.1080/00076790802246087.
Hertog, Steffen, ‘Defying the Resource Curse: Explaining Successful State-Owned Enterprises in 
Rentier States’, World Politics 62/2 (2010), pp. 261–301. doi:10.1017/S0043887110000055.
Hertog, Steffen, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2010).
Hertog, Steffen, ‘Saudi Aramco as a National Development Agent’, NOREF Policy Brief, August 2013. 
Available at http://noref.no/Regions/Middle-East-and-North-Africa/The-Gulf/Publications/
Saudi-Aramco-as-a-national-development-agent-recent-shifts (accessed 25 September 2016).
Hertog, Steffen, ‘The Post-WWII Consolidation of  Gulf  Nation-States: Oil and Nation-Building’, in 
J. Peterson (ed.), The Emergence of  the Gulf  States (London: Bloomsbury, 2016).
Jones, Calvert W., ‘Seeing Like an Autocrat: Liberal Social Engineering in an Illiberal State’, 
Perspectives on Politics 13/1 (2015), pp. 24–41. doi:10.1017/S1537592714003119.
Lippman, Thomas, Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 2004).
Luciani, Giacomo, ‘Allocation Vs. Production States’, in H. Beblawi and G. Luciani (eds.), The Rentier 
State, edited by (London, Croom Helm, 1987).
Mahdavy, Hussein, ‘Patterns and Problems of  Economic Development in Rentier States’, in M. A. 
Cook (ed.), Studies in the Economic History of  the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).
Ouroussoff, Nicolai, ‘In Arabian Desert, a Sustainable City Rises’, New York Times, 25 September 
2010. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/arts/design/26masdar.html (accessed 
14 September 2016).
Ross, Andrew, ‘Human Rights, Academic Freedom, and Offshore Academics’, AAUP, 
January–February 2011. Available at http://www.aaup.org/article/human-rights-academic-free-
dom-and-offshore-academics#.VlPS2b8Szkw (accessed 14 September 2016).
Steffen Hertog 25 
LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series
Abdulla, Abdulkhaleq, ‘Contemporary Socio-Political Issues of  the Arab Gulf  Moment’, LSE Kuwait 
Programme Paper Series 11 (2010).
Al-Kuwari, Duha, ‘Mission Impossible? Genuine Economic Development in the Gulf  Cooperation 
Council Countries’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 33 (2013).
Al-Ojayan, Hessah, ‘Treating the Oil Addiction in Kuwait: Proposal for Economic Reform’, LSE 
Kuwait Programme Paper Series 41 (2016).
Al-Zumai, Fahad, ‘Kuwait’s Political Impasse and Rent-Seeking Behaviour: A Call for Institutional 
Reform’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 29 (2013).
Alshalfan, Sharifa, ‘The Right to Housing in Kuwait: An Urban Injustice in a Socially Just System’, 
LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 28 (2013).
Bahgat, Gawdat, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Gulf  - An Assessment’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper 
Series 16 (2011).
Baldwin-Edwards, Martin, ‘Labour Immigration and Labour Markets in the GCC Countries: 
National Patterns and Trends’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 15 (2011). 
Barakat, Sultan, ‘The Qatari Spring: Qatar’s Emerging Role in Peacemaking’, LSE Kuwait Programme 
Paper Series 24 (2012). 
Barakat, Sultan and Skelton, John, ‘The Reconstruction of  Post-War Kuwait: A Missed Opportunity?’, 
LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 37 (2014).
Barakat, Sultan and Zyck, Steven A, ‘Gulf  State Assistance to Conflict-Affected Environments’, LSE 
Kuwait Programme Paper Series 10 (2010). 
Brinkley, Ian; Hutton, Will; Schneider, Philippe; and Coates Ulrichsen, Kristian, ‘Kuwait and the 
knowledge economy’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 22 (2012).
Burke, Edward, ‘One blood and one destiny? Yemen’s relations with the Gulf  Cooperation Council’, 
LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 23 (2012).
Chalcraft, John, ‘Monarchy, Migration and Hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula’, LSE Kuwait 
Programme Paper Series 12 (2010).
Coates-Ulrichsen, Kristian, ‘Basra, southern Iraq and the Gulf: challenges and connections’, LSE 
Kuwait Programme Paper Series 21 (2012). 
Coates-Ulrichsen, Kristian, ‘Gulf  Security: Changing Internal and External Dynamics’, LSE Kuwait 
Programme Paper Series 2 (2009).
Colton, Nora Ann, ‘Social Stratification in the Gulf  Cooperation Council States’, LSE Kuwait 
Programme Paper Series 14 (2011). 
Cronin, Stephanie and Masalha, Nur, ‘The Islamic Republic of  Iran and the GCC States: Revolution 
to Realpolitik?’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 17 (2011). 
Davidson, Christopher, ‘Persian Gulf  – Pacific Asia Linkages in the 21st Century: A Marriage of 
Convenience?’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 7 (2010).
El-Katiri, Laura; Fattouh, Bassam and Segal, Paul, ‘Anatomy of  an Oil-Based Welfare State: Rent 
Distribution in Kuwait’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 13 (2011).
26 A Quest for Significance
Herb, Michael, ‘The Origins of  Kuwait’s National Assembly’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 39 (2016).
Hertog, Steffen, ‘Rent Distribution, Labour Markets and Development in High Rent Countries’, LSE 
Kuwait Programme Paper Series 40 (2016).
Hertog, Steffen, ‘The Private Sector and Reform in the Gulf  Cooperation Council’, LSE Kuwait 
Programme Paper Series 30 (2013).
Hertog, Steffen and Luciani, Giacomo, ‘Energy and Sustainability Policies in the GCC’, LSE Kuwait 
Programme Paper Series 6 (2009).
Hvidt, Martin, ‘Economic Diversification in GCC Countries: Past Record and Future Trends’, LSE 
Kuwait Programme Paper Series 27 (2013).
Koch, Christian, ‘Constructing a Viable EU-GCC Partnership’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 34 (2014).
Koren, Miklos and Tenreyro, Silvana, ‘Volatility, Diversification and Development in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council Countries’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 9 (2010).
Kraetzschmar, Hendrik and Lahlali, El Mustapha, ‘The State of  e-Services Delivery in Kuwait: 
Opportunities and Challenges’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series Research Paper Series 20 (2012).
Krane, Jim and Wright, Steven, ‘Qatar ‘Rises Above’ its Region: Geopolitics and the Rejection of 
the GCC Gas Market’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 35 (2014).
Krause, Wanda, ‘Gender and Participation in the Arab Gulf ’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 4 (2009). 
Lacroix, Stephane, ‘Saudi Islamists and the Arab Spring’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 36 (2014). 
Michaels, Guy, ‘Challenges for Research on Resource-Rich Economies’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper 
Series 8 (2010). 
Partrick, Neil, ‘The GCC: Gulf  State Integration or Leadership Cooperation?’, LSE Kuwait Programme 
Paper Series 19 (2011). 
Partrick, Neil, ‘Nationalism in the Gulf  States’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 5 (2009). 
Partrick, Neil, ‘Saudi Arabia and Jordan: Friends in Adversity’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 31 
(2013). 
Peterson, J. E., ‘The GCC States: Participation, Opposition, and the Fraying of  the Social Contract’, 
LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 26 (2012). 
Power, Greg, ‘The Difficult Development of  Parliamentary Politics in the Gulf: Parliaments and the 
Process of  Managed Reform in Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 25 (2012).
Segal, Paul, ‘How to Spend it: Resource Wealth and the Distribution of  Resource Rents’, LSE Kuwait 
Programme Paper Series 18 (2011). 
Shah, Nasra M, ‘Second Generation Non-Nationals in Kuwait: Achievements, Aspirations and 
Plans’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 32 (2013).
Thatcher, Mark, ‘Governing Markets in Gulf  States’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 1 (2009).
Wilson, Rodney, ‘The Development of  Islamic Finance in the GCC’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper 
Series 3 (2009).
Young, Karen, ‘Markets serving states: the Institutional Bases of  Financial Governance in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council States’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 38 (2015).
Publications Editor 




© Abu Dhabi Airports
The views and opinions expressed in this publica-
tion are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
represent those of the London School of Economics 
and Political Science (LSE) or the Middle East Centre. 
This document is issued on the understanding that if any 
extract is used, the author(s) and the LSE Middle East 
Centre should be credited, with the date of the publi-
cation. While every effort has been made to ensure the 
accuracy of the material in this paper, the author(s) and/
or the LSE Middle East Centre will not be liable for any 
loss or damages incurred through the use of this paper. 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
holds the dual status of an exempt charity under 
Section 2 of the Charities Act 1993 (as a constituent part 
of the University of London), and a company limited by 





London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE 
@LSEKuwait
